The Trouble With City of Boerne, and Why It Matters for the Voting Rights Act by Lee, Evan Tsen
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
2012
The Trouble With City of Boerne, and Why It
Matters for the Voting Rights Act
Evan Tsen Lee
UC Hastings College of the Law, leee@uchastings.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Evan Tsen Lee, The Trouble With City of Boerne, and Why It Matters for the Voting Rights Act, 90 Denver University Law Review 483
(2012).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1106
THE TROUBLE WITH CITY OF BOERNE, AND WHY IT 
MATTERS FOR THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT AS WELL 
EVAN TSEN LEE t 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court's test for the constitutionality of state action 
and its test for the constitutionality of congressional legislation enforcing 
the Fourteenth Amendment are out of synch with one another. When a 
plaintiff challenges state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
degree of scrutiny varies with the type of claim. Racial classifications, 
for -example, are examined under strict scrutiny. Most classifications, 
such as disability, age, or socioeconomic status, are examined on a ra-
tional basis. When Congress acts pursuant to its Section 5 powers under 
the Fourteenth Amendment to protect rights, however, the Court has no 
corresponding spectrum of degrees of scrutiny. In this Lecture, I argue 
that the Court should adopt the "mirror image" spectrum of scrutiny for 
congressional enactments pursuant to its Section 5 powers. For example, 
if Congress seeks to protect people from age discrimination or discrimi-
nation based on disability by permitting individuals to sue states without 
their consent in federal court, the plaintiff should have to show that he or 
she actually suffered a constitutional violation in the case at bar. If Con-
gress seeks to protect people from race discrimination, the plaintiff 
should have to show only that there is a rational, means---end relationship 
between the congressional remedy and the targeted discrimination. Ap-
plying this test to the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits race dis-
crimination in voting, the courts should apply rational, means---end scru-
tiny to statutes such as the Voting Rights Act, including the preclearance 
condition that is presently before the Court in Shelby County v. Holder. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
My topic today is how the federal courts should handle congres-
sional enactments purporting to enforce two of the three Reconstruction 
Amendments-the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. I These issues 
have been important for fifty years now, and their importance has not 
diminished in the least. Last Term, the Supreme Court decided one such 
case under the Fourteenth Amendment, Coleman v. Court of Appeals,2 
and it seems likely that the Court will soon review a case involving pre-
clearance under the Voting Rights Act,3 which obviously grows out of 
the Fifteenth Amendment.4 
The Supreme Court's current approach to judging congressional 
legislation meant to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment comes from a 
1997 case called City of Boerne v. Flores,S which I believe to be correct 
in one important respect and seriously misguided in another. Today, I 
will call for the repudiation of that second aspect of City of Boerne, to be 
replaced by something I call the "mirror image" approach. Finally, I will 
say why I think this has implications for legislation, such as the Voting 
Rights Act, enacted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment. 
( u.s. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws."); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 ("The 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."). 
Why have I not extended my approach to the Thirteenth Amendment? I have chosen to 
save this topic for another day because my instinct is that Congress should have the very broadest 
latitude when legislating under Section 2 of that Amendment, simply because there is no state action 
requirement, and therefore, there are little or no federalism costs involved in such legislation. 
2. 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
4. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012), petition for cer!. filed 81 
USLW 3064 (U.S. July 20,2012) (No. 12-96). 
5. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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II. WHAT Is THE CITY OF BOERNE FRAMEWORK? 
In City of Boerne, the question was whether the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (RFRA)6 was an "appropriate exercise" of Congress's 
powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.7 The relevant 
characteristic of RFRA was its attempt to legislatively overrule the Su-
preme Court's decision in the so-called peyote case, Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith.8 In City of Boerne; the Court ruled that in order for a con-
gressional enactment under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
pass muster, it must "enforce" constitutional rights, and the remedy cho-
sen for enforcement must be "congruen[t] and proportional[]" to those 
rights.9 
The decision in City of Boerne answers three important questions 
related to the appropriateness of legislation under Section 5. The first 
question is whether the power to enforce constitutional rights includes 
only situations involving actual violations of constitutional rights or 
whether it also includes deterrence of potential constitutional violations. 
The second question is, for purposes of scrutinizing Section 5 enforce-
ment legislation, Who decides what constitutional rights are cognizable? 
That is, who interprets Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment-
Congress or the courts? The third question is, assuming at least some 
deterrence of potential constitutional violations is permissible, How 
should the courts decide how much deterrence is appropriate? This third 
question has the potential to overlap the first question. 
On the first question, City of Boerne unambiguously held that some 
deterrence of constitutional violations is permissible. Today, all of the 
Justices adhere to that position except Justice Scalia, who argues that 
Congress may only legislate remedies for people who can demonstrate 
that their personal Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated. 10 
On the second question, at least in theory, there are three possible 
answers. When it comes to who decides what constitutes a cognizable 
constitutional right for purposes of judging appropriateness under Sec-
tion 5, (1) Congress itself could have the last word; (2) the Court could 
give some level of deference to Congress's interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment; or (3) the Court could decide the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment with no deference to Congress's interpretation. 
The City of Boerne Court chose the third-no deference. 
6. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,107 Stat. 1488 (1993), 
invalidated by City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
7. City of Boerne, 521 U.S.at517. 
8. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
9. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20. 
10. Importantly, however, he would make an exception in the race discrimination cases be-
cause of stare decisis. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,557-65 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Qn the third question, having already decided that Congress may act 
to prevent potential constitutional violations, the Court further decided 
that all remedial legislation must be congruent and proportional to such 
potential constitutional violations. A literary analysis of the phrase "con-
gruent and proportional" suggests a fairly non-deferential standard of 
review, as in the requirement of a tight, if not perfect, fit between the 
remedy and the constitutional rights to be protected. We will see that 
subsequent cases confirm this literary analysis. We will also see that if 
one agrees with Justice Scalia on the first question--every plaintiff must 
show his or her own constitutional violation-that answers the third 
question about the relationship between right and remedy. 
III. THE MERITS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CiTY OF BOERNE 
Those were the answers provided by City of Boerne, and I will now 
examine those answers. I am going to take the questions out of order, 
because my views on questions two and three do, in fact, affect my view 
on question one. 
A. Who Decides What the Constitution Means? 
Let us start with question two-Who decides what counts as a vio-
lation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment for purposes of Sec-
tion 5? I think we have to rule out Congress having the last word on the 
interpretation of "Equal Protection" or "Due Process." It is theoretically 
possible to have one interpretation of these grand phrases for purposes of 
scrutinizing remedial legislation and an entirely different interpretation 
for purposes of scrutinizing state action. But there is little to recommend 
such a schizoid system. Constitutional law is confusing enough. 
The two remaining options, then, are to accord some deference· to 
Congress's interpretation of the rights enumerated in Section I of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or to give them no deference whatsoever. Of the 
two, I think the more tenable view is for the courts to accord congres-
sional interpretation no deference-but with an important asterisk. The 
reason not to accord congressional interpretation deference is the one I 
just gave-we ought not have two interpretations of "Equal Protection" 
or "Due Process" or "Privileges and Immunities" for one purpose and a 
different interpretation for another purpose. If the Court defers, even 
somewhat, for one purpose, it will potentially create that difference. 
Here is the asterisk. The Court should be open to the persuasive 
force of Congress's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Con-
sider the peyote case, in which the Court held that the Free Exercise 
Clause does not apply to any law of general applicability (i.e., so long as 
it does not single out any religion for negative treatment, a law cannot 
violate free exercise). In RFRA, Congress tried to reinstate the case law 
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overruled in Smith, which (at least in theory) had held that any law bur-
dening the exercise of religion was subj ect to strict scrutiny. 11 
Deference to Congress's attempted reinstatement to the previous 
case law would have required the Court to accept Congress's interpreta-
tion unless it failed some kind of test, whether rationality or something 
else. I think the Court should have considered whether Congress's inter-
pretation could have been folded into the Court's view without compro-
mising the basic principle that the Court found in the Free Exercise 
Clause. The basic principle of Smith is that government cannot be pro-
hibited from achieving legitimate, across-the-board legislative goals by 
claims that such enactments infringe on religious practices. But that prin-
ciple could easily have been preserved if the Court had simply ruled that 
the Free Exercise Clause protected the ritual use of peyote by a group 
with a sincere, longstanding practice, that the ritual was central to the 
religion, and that the effects of ritual peyote u:;e did not impact the per-
formance of employees. The peyote law could have been held unconsti-
tutional as applied to the type of usage in the case at bar. This is not any-
thing close to the strict scrutiny that Congress had tried to impose 
through RFRA-yet at the same time it incorporates the values that Con-
gress saw in the Free Exercise Clause into the Court's core interpretation 
of the Clause. 
Thus, I agree with the general approach of City of Boerne on the 
matter of who finally decides what the Constitution means. It must be the 
courts. But the courts should take seriously what values Congress fmds 
immanent in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and they should 
try to accommodate those values in a manner not inconsistent with the 
principles that the Court itself finds in the Fourteenth Amendment. To 
reiterate, however, once the United States Supreme Court has completed 
that analysis-whether it finds anything in Congress's view persuasive 
or not-there remains only a single interpretation of the right involved, 
and that is the Court's. 
B. What Relation Must There Be Between Rights and Remedies? 
I now tum .to the third question, which is what relationship congres-
sional remedies must bear to the constitutional rights needing protection. 
City of Boerne held that such remedies must be congruent and propor-
tional to the constitutional rights needing protection. 12 With one reluctant 
reservation, I reject that view. 
The congruence and proportionality standard is poor judicial 
craftsmanship. It provides no real guidance to Congress, the lower 
courts, or lawyers as to what enforcement legislation will pass muster. 1n 
II. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny to a 
free exercise claim). 
12. CityofBoeme,521 U.S. at 519-20 (1997). 
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the end, concluding that a remedy is not congruent and proportional to 
the record of constitutional violations before Congress amounts to little 
more than the statement, "These shoes don't feel good on me." If it takes 
twenty minutes with a shoehorn and pliers to get the shoes on, yes, 
they're too small. If you have to scrunch up your toes to keep them from 
flopping off every other step, they're too big. But in between those ex-
tremes, you can't just look at someone standing in a pair of shoes and tell 
whether they are a good fit. Only that person can really tell. 
One might say that it does not matter because the Supreme Court is 
going to review all these statutes itself and the Nine will decide whether 
the shoes fit. But that is not a sufficient answer. Congress constantly 
amends and updates many of these statutes, such as the Voting Rights 
Act. Each time it amends, the contours of the shoe change. Moreover, 
feet change size over time too. The conditions in American society are 
constantly changing-in some ways for the better, in others for the 
worse. The Supreme Court cannot, and should not have to, grant review 
every time statutes are updated or conditions change. Never mind the 
expenditure of judicial resources-the sheer lag time will create injustic-
es that ought not be tolerated. 
But if not congruence and proportionality, then what? At one end of 
the spectrum lies a highly deferential rationality test. Dean Evan 
Caminker argued several years ago that the Court should judge all con-
gressionallegislation under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by 
the same standard as analyses conducted under the Commerce Clause-
the highly deferential McCullough v. Mary/ani3 means-end test. 14 At 
the other end of the spectrum, Justice Scalia has taken the position that 
Congress may only provide remedies for actual violations of the Four-
teenth Amendment-in other words, that Congress may only authorize 
people to sue if the plaintiff can prove a constitutional violation in the 
case at bar. IS Under Justice Scalia's test, the relationship between remedy 
and right is always one to one. 
IV. WHAT SHOULD REPLACE CITY OF BOERNE? 
My position is that there should be no single test for .the permissible 
relationshIp between right and remedy. The test should depend on the 
type of scrutiny the Court would employ when testing state action for 
constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment. The kind of scrutiny 
that the Court imposes on congressional remedies should mirror the 
13. 17 U.s. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
14. Id. at 421; see also Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Sec-
tion 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1127, 1133,1161 (2001). This position once commanded a majori-
ty of the Court, at least with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 
U.S. 641,650 (1966). 
15. Lane, 541 U.S. at 558-61, 564 (Scalia, 1., dissenting) (suggesting he would permit some 
prophylaxis in the race discrimination cases on the basis of stare decisis). 
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Court's well-established levels of scrutiny in examining the constitution-
ality of state action. As you all know, the level of scrutiny in examining 
state action depends on what kind of right is at stake. Classifications 
based on race, national origin, alienage, and a few other things trigger 
strict scrutiny. 16 A classification based on sex triggers intermediate scru-
tiny.l? Almost all other kinds of state action are judged on a "rational 
basis"-if there is a rational relationship between the state action and a 
legitimate governmental purpose, the action is not unconstitutional. 18 
I will call my position the mirror image thesis. By that, I simply 
mean that the scrutiny the Court applies to congressional enactments 
under the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment should 
be the mirror image of the scrutiny that the Court already applies to 
judge the constitutionality of state action. Thus, under my argument, if 
the classification or right at stake triggers strict scrutiny, then Congress 
should be permitted to authorize broad prophylactic measures-anything 
that is rationally related to eradicating or preventing race discrimination 
by state actors. If the classification or right at stake triggers only rational 
basis review, then I will argue that Congress may authorize the courts to 
remedy only constitutional violations that have already occurred. For 
rights that trigger intermediate scrutiny, I will argue for something in the 
middle. Finally, I will urge that the Court apply the same rationale to the 
Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from discriminating on the 
basis of race in voting. 
No one should be astounded by my thesis. The tiers-of-scrutiny 
framework can ultimately be traced back to a source no less august than 
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products CO.,19 which sug-
gested that the Court ought to have a narrower presumption of constitu-
tionality for legislation aimed at discrete and insular minorities.20 Nor am 
I the one who has tied Congress's enforcement powers under the Four-
teenth Amendment to these tiers of scrutiny-the Court did that at least 
as far back as 2006.21 In this Lecture, I am merely asking the Court to tie 
the review of Congress's legislation to the tiers of scrutiny in a precise 
manner, and to treat the Fifteenth Amendment as it treats the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Why am I attracted to the mirror image thesis? Two reasons. First, it 
perfectly matches Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
16. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984). 
17. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 
268,278-79 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
18. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420,425-26 (1961). 
19. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
20. Jd. at 152 n.4. 
21. See Bd. ofTrs. ofUniv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-75 (2001). 
490 DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 90:2 
ment with the states' duties under the Fourteenth Amendment. The more 
fundamental and historically rooted the states' failures to perform their 
duties under the Fourteenth Amendment, the less the Judiciary should 
interfere with Congress's attempts to enforce those duties. The less pro-
found that history of state failure, the less leeway Congress ought to have 
in legislating remedies. 
A. Recent Case Law 
A review of the Court's modem jurisprudence respecting congres-
sional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment starts with the "new 
federalism" cases of the early 1990s. During the time the Court was 
pruning back the Commerce Clause in United States v. Lopez,22 it was 
scaling back Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in City of Boerne. 
Not long thereafter, the Court handed down three more cases strik-
ing down statutes as improper under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense 
Board v. College Savings Bank,23 Congress had amended the patent laws 
to authorize private suits for damages against state governments for pa-
tent infringement. 24 The Court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not provide Congress the power to enact such a law. 
True, patent law creates property interests, and the Due Process Clause 
as it applies against the states prohibits takings without due process. But 
the Court found that Congress had failed to identify any pattern of un-
constitutional patent infringement by the states. Consequently, the Patent 
Remedy Act25 was not congruent and proportional to any actual history 
of constitutional violations by the states. 
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,26 some former employees of 
the Florida State University sued the school for money damages under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),27 claiming that 
certain pay adjustments discriminated against older employees.28 Wheth-
er or not states had a history of discriminating on the basis of age-
Congress had neglected to document any such history-it was far from 
clear that such discrimination was irrational, said the majority. The ab-
sence of evidence of irrationality was critical because age is not a suspect 
classification and triggers no heightened scrutiny. Thus the rational basis 
test applies ip judging the constitutionality of state-sponsored discrimina-
22. 514 U.s. 549, 559 (1995). 
23. 527 U.s. 627 (1999). 
24. [d. at 630. 
25. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. \02-560, 106 
Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 296 (2006)), invalidated by Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary 
Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
26. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
27. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.c. §§ 621-634 (2006). 
28. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66, 69-70. 
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tion on the basis of age. The Court concluded that Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment did not empower Congress to enact the ADEA.29 
The next in the series was Board o/Trustees v. Garrett.30 This case 
was the consolidation of two suits against the University of Alabama by 
former employees who alleged that the school had violated a portion of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).3! A majority of the 
Supreme Court held that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
support enactment of the ADA any more than it did the enactment of the 
ADEA.The majority opinion in Garrett featured the same emphasis as in 
Kimel that the classification of disability does not trigger any heightened 
scrutiny under constitutional analysis. In enacting the ADA, Congress in 
fact had marshaled an impressive record of discrimination against disa-
bled persons. But the majority rejected virtually all of the examples for 
vanous reasons. 
The first reason, following Kimel, was that not all acts of discrimi-
nation against the disabled are irrational. There are jobs that able-bodied 
people can do that disabled persons cannot do without something more 
than what the Court has determined to constitute "reasonable accommo-
dation.,,32 So again, the lack of heightened scrutiny played a major factor 
in Garrett. But the Court did not stop there. The Court also brushed aside 
acts of discrimination against the disabled by local governments. True, 
local governments are instrumentalities of the state. But because the 
ADA authorized private suits for money damages against the state, all of 
the acts of discrimination against disabled persons had to be by state em-
ployees because local governments are not covered by the Eleventh 
Amendment. That, of course, meant that private acts of discrimination 
against the disabled-no matter how cruel, animus-based, or utterly irra-
tional-were also irrelevant to the analysis. In the end, the Court con-
cluded that Congress had identified only six scattered acts of irrational 
discrimination against disabled persons by various states over the years. 
The provision of a private cause of action for money damages against 
states in federal court was not a congruent and proportional remedy for 
those six scattered acts of irrational state discrimination. 
Thus the Court had established a two-step process for determining 
whether Congress had properly used its Section 5 powers to authorize 
private suits for damages against states in federal court. The first was to 
scour the congressional record for findings of sufficiently widespread 
29. The Commerce Clause almost certainly empowers Congress to enact the ADEA, but 
because of Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), Congress may not authorize private suits 
for money damages against the states under the ADEA. [d. at 72-73 (holding that Congress's powers 
to subject unconsenting states to suit for money damages do not extend to either the Interstate Com-
merce Clause or the Indian Commerce Clause). 
30. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). 
32. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 385-86. 
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actual constitutional violations by states. If that prong were satisfied, the 
Court would proceed to whether the legislative remedy was congruent 
and proportional to this history of constitutional violations. 
In three cases since Garrett, the Court has upheld laws under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, pennitting private suits for damag-
es against states in federal court. The first of those, Nevada Department 
of Human Services v. Hibbs,33 concerned the family-care leave provision 
in the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).34 When it enact-
ed the FMLA, Congress documented a sufficiently widespread history of 
gender-based discrimination in the dispensation of family and medical 
leave. Congress found that states had perpetuated the stereotype of wom-
en as family caretakers and men as breadwinners by giving women leave 
to rear children but denying such leave to men. And, because gender 
discrimination triggers some fonn of heightened scrutiny, the majority, 
led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, was satisfied that the first prong was met. 
The Court did not flyspeck the congressional findings on prior discrimi-
nation as it had done in Garrett and Kimel, but it nonetheless found that 
there was a sufficient history of constitutional violations. It then went on 
to find that the family-care provision of the FMLA was a congruent and 
proportional response to the history of violations. 
In Tennessee v. Lane,35 the Court took up the validity of a different 
portion of the ADA than it had reviewed in Garrett. Lane involved a case 
where a criminal defendant literally had to crawl up the stairs on his 
hands and knees to a court proceeding because the local courthouse had 
no elevator to accommodate his wheelchair. The Court held that this por-
tion of the ADA was supported by Section 5 on the ground that Lane had 
been denied a fundamental right-access to court-which, in tum, trig-
gered heightened scrutiny under constitutional analysis. Then, in United 
States v. Georgia,36 the Court had no trouble finding that a paraplegic 
inmate in a state prison could sue under the same provision of the ADA 
involved in Lane.3? The state had failed to provide him with a toilet that 
he could use without assistance, which squarely violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights. 
Last Term, the Court, having zigged for several years, zagged again. 
In Coleman, the Court reviewed the self-care provision in the FMLA. 
Although it had upheld the family-care provision of the FMLA in Hibbs 
nine years earlier, the Court now held that the self-care provision could 
not be justified by Section 5. The majority, led by Justice Kennedy, 
found that there was no real connection between the states' history of 
33. 538 u.s. 72I (2003). 
34. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006). 
35. 541 u.s. 509 (2004). 
36. 546 u.s. 151 (2006). 
37. Id. at 159. 
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gender discrimination and the self-care provision. Congress created the 
self-care provision not to remedy any past gender discrimination but 
simply to provide employees with the flexibility in work arrangements 
necessary to care for themselves. Thus there was really no question of 
whether the self-care provision was congruent and proportional to the 
history of constitutional violations; the Court had found that there was no 
relationship at all between the two. 
In dissent, Justice Ginsburg laid out a powerful historical rebuttal. 
She explained that the self-care provision was part of a holistic remedy 
for gender discrimination in employment and in leave policies. Without 
the self-care provision, the statute as a whole was greatly hampered in its 
effectiveness. But it is not my current purpose here to assess who has the 
better statutory construction argument. I wish to look at the Court's 
modes of review in these Section 5 cases and attempt to gauge what as-
pects appear settled and what aspects appear unsettled. 
Erwin Chemerinsky (among others) has argued that the following 
approach can be deduced from the cases.38 If the right at stake is one that 
triggers some kind of heightened scrutiny, then it does not matter wheth-
er or to what extent Congress has documented a history of constitutional 
violations. As a practical matter, that is the end of the inquiry; the legis-
lation will be found constitutional. If the right at stake is one that gener-
ally triggers only rational basis review, then Congress must document a 
sufficiently widespread history of constitutional violations by the states. 
This is a difficult project because discriminatory acts by local officials or 
private actors do not count; only those of state officials count. Further-
more, the discrimination must be irrationa1 because no heightened level 
of scrutiny has been triggered. Even if plaintiffs can surmount this test, 
they must then convince the court that Congress's chosen remedy is con-
gruent and proportional to the history of discrimination .. 
As I have said, the intellectual origins of the tiers-of-scrutiny ap-
proach trace back in large part to footnote four of Carolene Products. 
Discrete and insular minorities are less able to obtain relief from discrim-
ination through the political process. But there is another reason to vary 
the level of scrutiny based on the type of claim involved. It is a plain fact 
that some constitutional violations are more stubbornly rooted in our 
nation's history than others are. Yes, we have discriminated against 
heavy people and short people and, in a more serious vein, against people 
with learning disabilities and treatable mental health issues. But it simply 
blinks reality to say that America has discriminated against those groups 
as consistently and seriously as it has against such groups as African-
Americans, Mexican-Americans, Native Americans, and women. There 
are certain social cleavages around which our political, economic, and 
38. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 477 (5th ed. 2007). 
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cultural structures have been built, and they are familiar-race, national 
origin, religion, and sex. There are other traits that society has irrational-
ly made points of distinction, but not in nearly as profound a manner. 
B. Why "Rational Basis" Review Should Not Govern Scrutiny of All 
Fourteenth Amendment Legislation 
But if any form of state-sponsored discrimination is irrational, Why 
not give Congress broad authority to legislate against them? My answer 
is trite, but nonetheless true: because the federal government is still a 
government of enumerated powers. Suppose Congress were to permit 
private, suits in federal court against states for having levied irrational 
regulatory burdens on failed businesses? Or private suits in federal court 
against states that place irrational restrictions on the possession of con-
cealed handguns? Or that discriminate irrationally against cigarette 
smokers? Every conceivable legislative objective can be couched as 
"discrimination" against somebody, or as the deprivation of someone's 
right to substantive due process. 
You may not think my parade ofhorribles very realistic, and indeed, 
you may think it more likely that Congress would do "good" and "pro-
gressive" things with near plenary powers. Even so, that would not 
change my mind. Giving Congress the power to legislate about virtually 
anything would throw off our existing balance of powers, with unknown 
and unknowable systemic consequences. If we were to start from scratch 
and redraft the Constitution, I do not know whether I would choose a 
federated system where the states are "sovereign." I might opt in favor of 
a centralized government. But we are not going to start from scratch, and 
realistically, we cannot. 
To me, that is one of the attractions of the mirror image thesis-it 
puts some meaningful limits on congressional power under the Four-
teenth Amendment. That raises the next question, which is, What rela-
tionship between right and remedy should the Court require,with respect 
to each tier of scrutiny? On the strict scrutiny end, the answer must be 
something highly deferential. Here, I would use the simple means-end 
test of McCullough, which I do not view as meaningfully different from 
the rational basis test used to judge the constitutionality of most state 
action. The remedy must enforce constitutional rights recognized by the 
Court, but the relationship between the remedy and the right merely has 
to be one of plausible justification. 
At the other end, What relationship must there be between legisla-
tive remedies and rights that trigger only rational basis scrutiny? I have 
just explained why I oppose a highly deferential standard of reviewing 
such legislation-it turns Section 5 into a near plenary grant of power to 
legislate against the states on almost any subject matter. Perhaps the 
Court could adopt a standard permitting legislation to enforce rights that 
trigger rational basis review only when the legislation is essential to the 
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preservation of such rights. My reservation about such a standard, how-
ever, comes from the same place that makes me uncomfortable with con-
gruence and proportionality. There is too much room for argument about 
what legislation is essential and what is merely desirable. 
At this end of the spectrum, I find myself alone with Justice Scalia, 
calling for an actual constitutional violation in the case at bar. In other 
words, when Congress legislates to enforce rights that trigger only ra-
tional basis review, the legislation should be held valid as applied only to 
cases where the plaintiff can demonstrate an actual constitutional viola-
tion in his or her case. To put it yet another way, when it comes to rights 
triggering rational basis review, Congress should not be permitted any 
prophylaxis or deterrence. It should be able to provide a remedy only in 
cases where the right has, in fact, been violated. Characteristic of Justice 
Scalia, this is a readily administrable, bright-line rule. 
Although only Justice Scalia has, to date, openly advocated such a 
standard, it is consistent with the Court's actual cases scrutinizing legis-
lation to enforce rights that trigger only,rational basis review. Kimel was 
actually the consolidation of three cases. In one, Daniel Kimel and other 
faculty members of a Florida state university sued to challenge the uni-
versity's failure to implement a previously announced pay increase. 
Their argument was that the failure to follow through with the pay raise 
had a disparate impact on older employees because they tended to have 
higher base salaries. Even if Kimel and his colleagues' allegations were 
true, however, the Court has held that disparate impact by itself never 
makes out a constitutional violation, so my proposal is consistent with 
the Court's treatment of Mr. Kimel's claim. 
In the second consolidated case, Wellington Dickson sued his em-
ployer, the Florida Department of Corrections, alleging that the depart-
ment had passed him over for promotion because of his age and then 
retaliated against him for filing a grievance. In the third consolidated 
case, Roderick MacPherson and Marvin Narz were associate professors 
at a state-run business college. They alleged that the college used an 
evaluation system that had a disparate impact on older faculty members, 
and that the college retaliated against them for filing grievances with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 
Under my thesis, whether the Court decided these cases correctly 
depends on whether one takes the retaliation charges seriously. Again, 
the disparate-impact claim does not state a constitutional violation. The 
department passing Mr. Dickson over for a promotion because of his age 
does not violate the Constitution because a rational basis can be articu-
lated for encouraging old professors to retire.39 Not every professor be-
yond a certain age has "lost it," but it is not irrational to think that com-
39. I resemble that remark. 
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petence generally diminishes beyond a point, and it is administratively 
costly to engage in case-by-case evaluations. On the other hand, retalia-
tion for filing a grievance clearly constitutes a First Amendment viola-
tion. If the retaliation claims in these cases were not merely plaintiffs-
lawyer-boilerplate tack-ons-and they usually are-then the Court was 
wrong to find that they could not sue in federal court. 
Garrett also involved consolidated cases. In one, Patricia Garrett 
was a registered nurse in the University of Alabama's Birmingham hos-
pital. She was diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent treatment, 
including chemotherapy. When she came back, she was told that she 
could not have her old position back, but rather would be relegated to a 
lower-paying position as a nurse manager. In the other case, Milton Ash 
was a security officer for the Alabama Department of Youth Services. He 
was diagnosed with chronic asthma and sleep apnea and asked for differ-
ent assignments that would accommodate these conditions. The depart-
ment did not accommodate him to his satisfaction. Both Garrett and Ash 
sued the State of Alabama in federal court for money damages pursuant 
to Title I of the ADA. 
Under rational basis review, neither of these plaintiffs stated a con-
stitutional violation. It is certainly possible that the hospital had promot-
ed someone else to a position in Garrett's absence such that it could not 
afford to pay Garrett her old salary any longer. That would have been a 
rational reason for acting as the hospital did. If that was the case, it was 
stupid management and poor employee relations, but those things are not 
unconstitutional. In Ash's case, perhaps there were no other open shifts. 
Or perhaps the department had a strict rule not to accommodate health 
conditions because then everyone would want to move their schedules 
around for allergies, sleep patterns, and so on. Don't get me wrong-
what Garrett and Ash alleged clearly violated Title I of the ADA. I mere-
ly note that neither of those allegations amounts to a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, under my thesis, the Court was right 
not to permit Congress to authorize these plaintiffs to sue the state for 
money damages in federal court.40 
That leaves the intermediate scrutiny cases. What relationship must 
exist between congressional remedies and rights triggering intermediate 
scrutiny? If you put a gun to my head, I suppose I am stuck with congru-
ence and proportionality. I just lack the imagination to articulate a test in 
between strict scrutiny and rational basis review that does not require 
some assessment of fit. I would need to invent a metric by which inter-
40. I would like to register my reservations about the Court's Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence. I agree that permitting private suits for money damages against un consenting states in federal 
courts is a significant federalism cost, but I do not necessarily agree with the Court's holding in 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 10 (1890), that the Eleventh Amendment applies in a case where the 
cause of action arises under federal law and where the plaintiff is a resident of the state. 
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mediate scrutiny of legislation could be exercised without reference to 
the relationship between means and ends. Yet the notion of intermediacy 
seems to denote that very relationship. Perhaps the Court should simply 
abandon the category of intermediate scrutiny. Sex as a classification 
could be moved to strict scrutiny and commercial speech could be moved 
to rational basis review. That would be my gut suggestion, but a defense 
of those views will have to await another day. 
e. The "Distribution and Currency of Violations" Issues 
Two important issues remain, which I shall treat together because I 
believe they are related. One is whether a pattern of violations in a few 
states justifies legislation that applies_ in all states. The other is whether 
Congress's power to legislate may only be based on current violations, or 
whether a history of violations triggers the Section 5 power. 
Under my proposal, neither of these issues arises when the claimed 
right triggers only rational basis review because my proposal would re-
quire an actual constitutional violation in the case at bar. If a plaintiff can 
demonstrate that his or her constitutional rights were violated by the 
state, then that state was obviously among the offenders, and the viola-
tion is current. 
But what if the claimed right would be reviewed under some form 
of heightened scrutiny? I believe the Court should ignore the distribution 
of violations among states for three reasons. One is that the types of con-
stitutional rights that trigger strict scrutiny have almost certainly been 
violated in all the states at one time or another. Slavery and Jim Crow 
may have been limited to the states of the former Confederacy, but at one 
point or another, facially neutral laws in almost every state have been 
enacted with the intent to disadvantage certain racial groups. It would be 
hard to think of a single state that has not, at one time or another, dis-
criminated on the basis of religion, if even only against atheists. All 
states at one time discriminated against women in their marital or crimi-
nal (rape) laws, to say nothing of their own employment policies. 
Another reason to disregard the distribution of violations among 
states is that when the states joined to create "a more perfect Union,'''') 
they surrendered some aspects of their sovereignty. One of them, in my 
estimation, was the privilege of having national legislation tailored to 
their idiosyncrasies. This is especially true when the problems spawning 
the legislation have broad and deep roots. 
The third reason to disregard the distribution of violations among 
states is also the reason why Congress need not rely on current violations 
to justify legislation. The framers of the Reconstruction Amendments 
desperately would have wanted to avoid new forms of state-sponsored 
41. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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discrimination based on race. It is beyond cavil that they saw slavery and 
any version of systematic racial oppression as a moral and practical fail-
ing of the nation. Did they succeed in eliminating all such oppression? 
For a few years, they came close, but that brief period of near formal 
equality proved all too transient. Jim Crow soon took hold and recreated 
the formal system of racial subordination. 
That is why the courts must not insist upon current violations to up-
hold legislation enforcing rights that trigger strict scrutiny. There are 
certain social dynamics that do not change over time. The players may 
change, but the dynamics remain the same. It is not only the United 
States. Look around the world. Most societies can absorb a small number 
of people who are not of the dominant race without much trouble. But let 
the number swell to significant proportions and the dominant group feels 
threatened. The dominant group then is tempted to use the law to rein-
force its dominance. Religions say tlWY are in favor of freedom of wor-
ship until they have enough power to seize the state apparatus and en- . 
force their beliefs on everyone. If your version of the Supreme Deity and 
holy scripture are right, then anyone who disagrees must be wrong-and 
their souls must be saved by whatever means necessary. The racial and 
religious targets change over the generations, but the human story re-
mains the same. That is why, when it comes to discrimination on the 
basis of race or religion, it is both foolish and dangerous to say, "Oh, that 
was then, this is now." 
One last loose end. It is true that the Court has defined "race dis-
crimination" under the Equal Protection Clause to mean only "intention-
al" discrimination, eschewing "disparate impact" as sufficient proof of a 
constitutional violation.42 Thus, one might argue against my proposal on 
the ground that remedial legislation based on race where no intentional 
discrimination can be proved would be struck down. One possible illus-
tration would be the proposed North Carolina Racial Justice Act,43 which 
would have dealt with racially disproportionate capital sentencing. With 
respect to this example, I simply disagree with the Court's conclusion 
that there is not intentional race discrimination involved in dispropor-
tionate capital sentencing. In the study involved in McCleskey v. Kemp,44 
and in subsequent studies, the late David Baldus and his colleagues of-
fered statistical evidence from which intentional race discrimination not 
only could have been inferred, but also should have been inferred.45 In 
some studies it was based on the race of the victim and in others on the 
42. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) 
(1994) as recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2010 (2011). 
44. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
45. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS passim (1990). 
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race of the defendant, but I believe it is inconsistent with the purpose of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to deny an inference of intentional discrimi-
nation in capital sentencing. 
In general, my response regarding disparate impact is this: in true 
cases where no inference of even partial racial motivation is warranted, 
the plaintiff should not win on a claim of race discrimination. But I be-
lieve both the Supreme Court and lower courts have been too quick to 
accept "plausibly neutral" explanations that were quite possibly pretextu-
al. The attitude that "we decline to assume that what is unexplained is 
invidious,,46 is, at least in some contexts, simply not a faithful application 
of existing doctrine. It is significant that Justice Powell, who wrote those 
words, later admitted that he had come to regard the McCleskey decision 
as a rnistake.47 
V. How DOES My THESIS AFFECT THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT? 
So much for legislation enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. What are the implications for the Fifteenth Amendment? 
As some of you may know, a D.C. Circuit panel in May handed 
down an opinion in a case called Shelby County v. Holder,48 in which 
Shelby County, Alabama, claimed that the preclearance provision of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, as reenacted for a period of twenty-five years 
in 2006, exceeds Congress's enforcement powers under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.49 The panel voted 2-1 to uphold the preclearance provision, 
and most observers expect the Supreme Court to take the case.50 
The Court will not be writing on a blank slate. In 1966, the Court 
decided a case called South Carolina v. Katzenbach,51 which made it 
clear that the federal courts were to review Congress's enforcement 
choices under the Fifteenth Amendment in the most deferential manner. 52 
But in 2009, the Supreme Court handed down an opinion whose tenor 
can best be characterized as, "It's not 1965 anymore, and all bets are 
off." 
The 2009 case is called Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District 
No. 1 v. Holder.53 A utility district in Texas challenged the constitution-
46. McCleskey, 481 U.S.at313. 
47. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.: A BIOGRAPHY 451 (1994). 
48. 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
49. [d. at 856--57, 863--64. 
50. The Court did grant certiorari in Shelby County on November 9,2012. The grant is limited 
to the following question: "Whether Congress'[s] decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act under the pre-existing coverage fonnula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act 
exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth 
Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution." Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848 
(D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (No. 12-96). 
51. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
52. !d. at 325-27. 
53. 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
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ality of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which requires some states and 
localities to obtain preclearance for certain types of changes to their vot-
ing systems. Congress first enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1957 pursu-
ant to its enforcement authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and has 
reenacted it numerous times, most recently in 2006, finding that it is still 
necessary to combat race discrimination in voting. The utility district had 
never itself discriminated in its elections, and requiring it to engage in 
the preclearance procedure exceeded Congress's Fifteenth Amendment 
powers, the district argued. 
The Supreme Court held in favor of the utility district, but not on 
the constitutional question. The Court found that the utility district was 
entitled to a statutory exemption from the preclearance procedure-
known in the Voting Rights Act lexicon as a bailout-and therefore the 
constitutional question was avoided. But the Court, speaking through 
Chief Justice Roberts, stated that the preclearance provision was consti-
tutionally suspect: "§ 5, 'which authorizes federal intrusion into sensitive 
areas of state and local policymaking, imposes substantial 'federalism 
costs.' These federalism costs have caused Members of this Court to 
express serious misgivings about the constitutionality of § 5.,,54 
Translation: Preclearance is strong prophylactic medicine. Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for all the Justices save Justice Thomas (who 
would have struck down § 5 on the spot), then engaged in what might 
fairly be characterized as a congruence and proportionality analysis: 
Some of the conditions that we relied upon in upholding this statu-
tory scheme [in the past] have unquestionably improved. Things have 
changed in the South .... 
. .. It may be that these improvements are insufficient and that 
conditions continue to warrant preclearance under the Act. But the 
Act imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs. 55 
The Court then hinted at its concerns about the fact that preclear-
ance is required of certain states and not of others-and that the basis for 
singling out the states required to engage in preclearance may not be up-
to-date. 
The evil that § 5 is meant to address may no longer be concentrat-
ed in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance. The statute's cov-
erage formula is based on data that is now more than 35 years old, 
and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current 
political conditions. 56 
54. Id. at 202 (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266,282 (\999». 
55. Id. at 202-03. 
56. Id. at 203. 
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Despite extensive briefmg on the question, the Court declined to de-
cide whether congruence and proportionality was required or whether the 
proper test was one of rationality. 57 
Thus, the Northwest Austin Court expressed strong disapproval for 
the notion that Congress can base current and continuing remedies on 
conditions that may have been eliminated decades ago. Such remedies 
impose serious federalism costs, and such costs can only be justified by 
roughly commensurate current needs in enforcing Fifteenth Amendment 
rights. 
I am no expert on the Voting Rights Act, but clearly not everyone 
who supports the preclearance provision thinks it is perfect as it is cur-
rently written. In particular, there seems to be too much emphasis on 
statewide redistricting, where discriminatory behavior is pretty transpar-
ent, and where the Justice Department has the greatest potential to en-
gage in partisan abuse of its preclearance powers. The current real needs 
lie more in local elections and their attendant conditions, which are not 
highly transparent, where it takes only a few bad actors to shut down 
groups of minority voters, and where the Attorney General of the United 
States has little incentive to game the system through his or her preclear-
ance powers. Professors Samuel Issacharoff and Michael Pitts have de-
bated the matter, and despite their divergent conclusions regarding the 
overall desirability of the preclearance provision, they agree on the point 
just mentioned. 
In his Shelby County opinion upholding the preclearance provision, 
Judge David Tatel of the D.C. Circuit dutifully followed Northwest Aus-
tin dicta on the standard of review. Because Northwest Austin stated that 
the preclearance provision raises serious constitutional questions under 
either the congruence and proportionality test used in cases like City of 
Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett or under the rational basis test used in cases 
like Hibbs and Lane, Judge Tatellogically assumed for the sake of ar-
gument that the congruence and proportionality standard applied-yet he 
found that the preclearance provision satisfied even that demanding 
test.58 
Why? Because the congressional record contained sufficient evi-
dence from which Congress could reasonably conclude that racial dis-
crimination in covered jurisdictions remains so serious and pervasive that 
individual litigation (as opposed to the systematic, prophylactic preclear-
ance system) is insufficient to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. As re-
counted in Judge Tatel's opinion, the town of Kilmichael, Mississippi, 
cancelled a 2001 election when there was "an unprecedented number" of 
57. Id. at 204. 
58. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848,859 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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African-American candidates.59 In 1998, Webster County, Georgia, pro-
posed to reduce the black population in three of the school board's dis-
tricts after the electorate voted in a majority of black board members for 
the first time in history. In 1993, Washington Parish, Louisiana, created a 
new at-large seat "to ensure that no white incumbent would lose his 
seat. ,,60 In the early 1990s, Mississippi legislators opposed a "redistrict-
ing plan that would have increased the number of black majority dis-
tricts, referring to the plan publicly as the 'black plan' and privately as 
the 'nigger plan.",61 Georgia's state House Reapportionment Committee 
Chairman "told his colleagues on numerous occasions, 'I don't want to 
draw nigger districts. ",62 
No. It's not 1965 anymore. But these incidents from the early 1990s 
to the early 2000s demonstrate that the states of the former Confederacy 
still have powerful forces whose clear intention is to minimize the elec-
toral impact of African-Americans. Would I limit the preclearance re-
quirement to the states of the former Confederacy? No, I would not. I 
will come out and say that I think it's probably needed in parts of Arizo-
na, parts of Texas, and parts of my home state of California. Should pre-
clearance continue to be required at the statewide level of every single 
Southern state? Maybe not. Maybe preclearance ought to be concentrated 
at the level of local government. 
But here is my point, and it is as unoriginal as any point can be: de-
cisions about what governmental entities should be subject to preclear-
ance are for Congress to decide, not the Court. As Judge Tatel said of the 
2006 renewal of the preclearance provision, "Congress found that serious 
and widespread intentional discrimination persisted in covered jurisdic-
tions and that 'case-by-case enforcement alone ... would leave minority 
citizens with [an] inadequate remedy. ",63 That conclusion is hardly irra-
tional, considering the evidence that faced Congress in 2006, and that 
ought to be the end of the inquiry. Race discrimination, no less under the 
Fifteenth Amendment than under the Fourteenth, is the most suspect kind 
of state action. When Congress acts pursuant to its Fourteenth or Fif-
teenth Amendment enforcement powers to combat such action, those 
enactments must be given the widest berth possible. Any plausible justi-
fication that can be articulated in favor of the legislation-whether or not 
Congress was actually motivated by it-must be permitted to sanction 
the enforcement scheme. The Court would clearly stray beyond its prop-
er boundaries in our constitutional system if it were to put the magnify-
59. Jd. at 865 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 36-37 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.) (internal 
quotation marks omitted». 
60. Jd. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 38 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.) (internal quotation 
mark omitted». 
61. Jd. at 866 (quoting Modem Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Congo 22 (2006». 
62. Jd. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 67 (2006) (Jud. Comm. Rep.». 
63. Jd. at 872 (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, at 57 (2006». 
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ing glass on the congressional record and insist upon the tightest possible 
fit between remedy and malady in every single situation. The generic cry 
of "federalism costs" does not, and cannot, change that boundary. 
Judge Tatel's masterful opinion for the panel in Shelby County pro-
vides a wonderful blueprint for the Court to uphold the preclearance pro-
vision, while expressing a desire for Congress to rework the provision to 
make it more focused on local practices than on statewide redistricting. 
The only disagreement I have with Judge Tatel stems from the fact that 
he is a judge deciding a real case and I am a commentator. The differ-
ence is in the standard of review. He apparently felt compelled to apply 
the congruence and proportionality standard. As I mentioned earlier, 
even in the cases where the rights trigger heightened scrutiny, the Court 
insists that it still does perform some kind of congruence and proportion-
ality review, although it is questionable whether the legislative facts sup-
port that conclusion. I would make it clear right now,just as I have made 
clear with respect to those Fourteenth Amendment cases involving rights 
that trigger strict scrutiny, that the congruence and proportionality test 
should not apply. The only question should be whether Congress had any 
conceivable rational basis to enact the remedial legislation-and, in the 
spirit of true rational basis review, the facts supporting that rational basis 
need not appear in the congressional record at the time of enactment. 
That is the only way for the Court to square its standards of reviewing 
state action for constitutionality with its standards for reviewing congres-
sional acts enforcing constitutional rights, both with respect to the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
No way, you say? Northwestern Austin portends nothing but a bat-
ting down of the preclearance provision in toto? That certainly could 
happen, but don't bet the rent money just yet. Consider the following 
quote: 
In assessing those questions, we are keenly mindful of our institu-
tional role. We fully appreciate that judging the constitutionality of 
an Act of Congress is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this 
Court is called on to perform." "The Congress is a coequal branch of 
government whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States." The Fifteenth Amendment em-
powers "Congress," not the Court, to determine in the first instance 
what legislation is needed to enforce it.64 
Those words are straight from the Chief Justice's opinion in North-
west Austin. And don't think for a minute that they are just window 
dressing. Every one of those nine Justices takes both federalism and sep-
64. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dis!. No. I v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204-06 (2009) (quoting 
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring) and Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981), respectively). 
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aration of powers seriously. Every one of them is keenly aware that the 
Court must stay within its proper role when reviewing legislation. Each 
of them sees things differently at the margins, and from different per-
spectives-that's why there are nine of them, not just one. But don't as-
sume that any of them are going to vote to chuck the preclearance provi-
sion without a good long look, just as none of them is going to vote to 
rubber-stamp it. The Justices are like your family members. At times 
they make you crazy, you want to strangle them, you wonder how you 
could really be related to them. There are days when you disagree on 
everything. But at the end of the day, you know they really want to do 
the right thing, and in this case, that would be to apply rational basis re-
view to all congressional enactments enforcing the right not to be dis-
criminated against on the basis of one's race. 
